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REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH OF RELIGION 
Louis Dupre 
Is it possible to reflect on religious truth from a position outside faith without seriously 
distorting what faith itself understands by its truth? As long as philosophy and theology 
remained united-until the end of the middle ages-such a reflection was neither needed 
nor attempted. The standpoint which an independent philosophy in the modem age has 
taken with respect to the problem of truth, where the knowing subject becomes the source 
of truth, would appear to render such an effort suspect. Nevertheless, this essay argues, 
we are justified in approaching the truth of religion through the models available in present 
philosophy: correspondence, coherence, disclosure. In all three cases, however, the 
application of the models needs to be qualified if it is to account for truth as faith itself 
understands it. 
If one thing distinguishes traditional religious conceptions of truth from modem 
philosophical ones, it is the absence, or secondary role, of epistemological 
concerns. Despite their substantial differences, all religious traditions agree in 
stressing the ontological and moral qualities of truth over the purely cognitive 
ones. Truth refers to being, rather than to knowledge. In Sanskrit, the mother 
tongue of our Indo-European languages, truth is satya while being is sat. Gandhi 
based his life-long quest for what he called truth upon this identity. In 1932 he 
formulated as follows: 
"Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why Sat or Truth 
is perhaps the more important name of God. In fact, it is more correct to 
say that 'Truth is God' than to say that 'God is Truth' .'" 
The proper attitude with respect to this ontological truth consists in the first place 
in devotion and fidelity: the path of truth is the path of devotion (bhakti)-the only 
path that leads to God. 2 In a religious vision of this nature lies, I believe, the ori-
gin of the so-called correspondence theory which later became so exclusively 
cognitive: the consistency between what is and one's conduct. Not to be "true" to 
one's self means, in fact, to descend to a lesser mode of being. Only when we are 
fully connected with Being shall we be able to know. The relation here is exactly 
the opposite of modem thought which starts from the primacy of consciousness. 3 
The nature of religious truth consists in the first place in an ontological state 
whereby the relation to God defines the definitive link with Being. That relation 
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also secures access to the source of ultimate meaning. All "true" knowing depends 
on a being in the truth. But the transcendent pole of the relation establishes 
man's awareness of the relation as well as the relation itself. Truth in religion 
implies more than merely admitting that an ontological bond with God exists. 
The recognition of that bond must itself be given. Truth then consists in the 
right relation to the ultimately real and only that transcendent reality can enlighten 
us concerning the nature and even the existence of that relation. This principle 
summarizes the fundamental belief about truth not only in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition but, if I am not mistaken, in all others as well. It marks the constant 
factor in religious truth. Our own tradition stands out by its increasing emphasis 
upon the second aspect-the need for a divine disclosure, a revelation. 
General Considerations 
If religion by its own account provides the basis of its own truth, can we move 
to a basis outside the domain of faith and yet hope fairly to evaluate that truth? 
Can faith accept any judgment critical of its truth that originates in an autonomous 
philosophy independently of the principles of faith itself? Can any statement be 
made about the truth of religion that does not coincide with the truth in religion 
itself without undoing or seriously distorting the latter? This much seems certain. 
A critical examination that on the basis of pure reason, independently of the 
religious experience proper, attempts to establish or disestablish "the truth of 
religion," must indeed result in distortion. Since modem philosophical theories 
of truth were developed mainly for the purpose of securing a foundation for 
scientific practice, this may appear to render them unfit for evaluating the specific 
nature of religious truth. Yet such a conclusion would be premature and, we 
hope to show, in the end unjustified. The basic models of truth used in those 
theories predate the scientific concerns of the modem age. They may, in fact, 
have grown out of a religious soil. Such was, almost certainly, the case with 
the disclosure model. But truth as correspondence and coherence were also 
formulated well before their modem methodic investigation started. Clearly, 
philosophy has developed these ancient models of truth on the basis of careful 
(albeit often unduly limited) analyses of the cognitive act. To compare religious 
claims to those models by no means commits one to the antitheological assump-
tions which often accompany their appearance in modem philosophy. But neither 
do we propose to "justify" religious truth in the light of that philosophy. Unless 
one assumes the basic legitimacy of the religious act on its own merits, attempts 
toward an all-comprehensive justification inevitably fail. Truth, as Spinoza 
taught, must prove itself: one cannot prove it to be true by another "truth" which 
presumably stands outside it. 
The following argument presupposes the existence of a truth proper to religion. 
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In comparing it with the existing models of truth we merely intend to investigate 
the aptitude of these models in clarifying that religious fact as well as the particular 
conditions required for successfully doing so. In a sense, then, it is philosophy, 
or at least its available apparatus, rather than religion, that is being examined 
here. To be sure, if the concept of religious truth proved to be radically incom-
patible with any of the existing models, the critical believer would have serious 
grounds for questioning the "truth of religion." For a comprehensive theory of 
truth, must, in principle, be able to adjudicate all legitimate claims of truth. If 
recent philosophy has often rejected the legitimacy of religious claims, the appli-
cation of the basic models, rather than the models themselves may be at fault. 
If, however, the religious concept of truth were to prove intractably resistant to 
any integration with other concepts of truth (such as the scientific ones) within 
the existing models, this would create a serious problem in the religious truth 
claims themselves. All the more so since these models originated long before 
any positivist restrictions were attached to it. Even though religion unfolds its 
own truth, it is forced to do so within the available categories of general discourse. 
Revelation itself cannot be rendered intelligible unless it still proves capable of 
being assumed within the modern pattern of speaking and thinking. However 
sublime and unique, a message confronts the elementary fact that, in order to 
be expressed, it must adopt an existing language and thereby integrate itself 
within a praxis of discourse. 
Western philosophy since its Greek origins has held truth to consist in an ideal 
presence, an objective quality that transcends the subjective experience of certainty. 
Only since the last century have philosophers begun to question this traditional 
position. Today certain psychological, sociological, or linguistic theories tend to 
reduce adherence to a particular epistemic position to unacknowledged factors in 
the individual or in the group to which the individual belongs. "Truth," in this 
view, would be attained by deconstructing the obvious surface structure and by 
gathering information about the building stones presumed to have been used in its 
construction. Obviously within such a perspective religion is apriori banned from 
presenting any truth claims at all. Since truth as demystification or deconstruction 
either begs the question of truth altogether or rests upon a more fundamental 
model to which it merely clears the access, we shall not consider it here. 4 
A. Correspondence 
The correspondence between word and reality appears even in the earliest 
tradition, if not as the central core of religious truth, at least as one of its essential 
components. Truth, also religious truth, requires that our words or concepts 
conform to things as they are in themselves. Philosophy, after it took the critical 
epistemic turn, found nothing but insoluble problems in such a neat division 
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between a purely "mental" concept and a purely "real" object. Precisely the 
invincible difficulties inherent in the unproven assumption of a harmony between 
the mind and the world led to Kant's radical reversal of the correspondence 
theory. After his "Copernican revolution" the line that distinguishes the corre-
spondence from the coherence theory becomes hard to draw. Thus Edmund 
Husserl in his basically Kantian Logical Investigations asserts about the relation 
between ideas and things: 
"The connection ofthings, to which the thought-experiences (Denkerleb-
nisse}--the real or the possible-are intentionally related, and, on the 
other hand, the connection of truths, in which the unity of things (die 
sachliche Einheit) comes to objective validity as that which it is-both 
are given together and cannot be separated from each other. "5 
The famous "things themselves" (die Sachen selbst) to which Husserl intends to 
return philosophy, prove then to be as ideal as the relations of consciousness. 
They constitute the invariable element in the mind's perspective variations. The 
very notion of intentionality-the relation between the mind and its object-is 
reinterpreted into one of immanent objectivity: the object belongs to the act of 
consciousness itself. It is constituted not independently of that act, but with and 
through it, yet with an immanent independence of the experience of the object. 
The intuition of truth in the end then is the outcome of a process in which we 
bring the object to givenness. A thing is given when it is brought to ideal 
presence. Clearly, in such an immanent interpretation the distinction between a 
theory of "correspondence" and one of coherence approaches the vanishing point. 
Even without following the Kantian reinterpretation to its idealist extremes 
we cannot but regard the appeal to "the facts" which some contemporary critics 
of religion continue to make, as patently uncritical. No facts are perceivable 
without a screen of interpretation that converts data into objects or facts. To 
perceive a complex of data as a fact always includes seeing them through an 
interpretation. Now in the case of religion which deals with the ultimate structure 
of the real itself, interpretation plays a particularly significant and inevitably 
controversial part. It is quite common for two people confronted with the same 
state of affairs to see it as religious or as non-religious and to do so without in 
the least contradicting each other on the relevant observable data. Both may 
agree on the basic interpretation, but one may feel the need for a further interpre-
tation which the other rejects or considers unnecessary. On a practical and on a 
limited theoretical level believers and unbelievers interpret the world in a manner 
so similar that they may intimately collaborate with one another on social or 
scientific projects without ever having to resolve major differences of interpreta-
tion. Basic, partial interpretations suffice for practical, scientific work, and even 
for a general cultural exchange. Nevertheless, the all-comprehensive, religious 
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interpretations shed a different light on all aspects of the real. To those who 
hold them they have the deepest impact upon emotional, ethical, and even 
motivational attitudes. 
A philosophical evaluation of the "truth of religion" on the basis of a corre-
spondence theory of truth, then, requires taking into account not only the legiti-
macy of separate levels of interpretation but, in addition, the possible conflict 
of an interpretation made on a basic level with those made on other levels. 
Nevertheless, there are solid reasons for continuing to speak of correspondence 
with respect to religious truth even in philosophical discourse. For truth in religion 
always presents itself as a relatedness to what ultimately is: a conversion, both 
moral and ontological, toward Being as it is in its very roots and origins, contrary 
to appearance and deception. The possible discrepancy between one and the 
other, as well as the process required to reach the state of total correspondence, 
suggest the existence of a separation between the mind and that ultimate reality 
which religious truth claims to bridge. Moreover, the "truth" thus attained is 
presented as revealed, that is, given to the mind from a principle or level of 
being that surpasses the mind's own reality. Here again the process of truth 
overcomes an initial duality between the mind and the "inner word" of revelation. 
It is worth noting that both these elements belong to the ideal realm (the only 
locus of truth since Kant) and hence that the correspondence theory thus applied 
to religious truth is not the naive-realistic one, but the modem critical one. 
B. Coherence 
Today most truth theories, implicitly or explicitly, refer to coherence. This is 
particularly the case with religious truth. Many who had become disheartened 
about the prospect of religious truth filling the demands for empiric~l verification 
advanced by positivists and empiricists, saw in the new forms of the coherence 
theory an escape from their troubles. Linguistic theories such as that found in 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations would legitimate any discourse in 
its own right, independently of others, provided it consistently apply the rules 
it set itself. Undoubtedly the coherence theory has protected the realm of religious 
meaning against undue intrusions of other realms. Each particular system, each 
"significant whole" as Harold Joachim defined it in his classical The Nature of 
Truth, obeys laws of its own that differ from those of other significant wholes. 6 
An internal articulation organically integrates the separate elements into a unity 
of meaning. In the case of religion such a recognition of a relative autonomy 
becomes particularly important since it dispenses us from applying criteria derived 
from those epistemic conditions that determine purely objective knowledge. 
Yet the theory as developed in modem epistemology requires several qualifi-
cations if it is to relate to what we have traditionally understood as religious 
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truth, or even to accomplish the more modest goal of justifying the meaningfulness 
of religious discourse. Coherence easily turns into closedness. To make genuine 
truth claims a system must be coherent not only within itself, but also with other 
systems. This requires at the very least that principles inherent in what we have 
called "basic" interpretations of experience do not contradict those implicit in a 
"higher" or more remote system of interpretation where religious truth places its 
stake. Recent debates on religious truth tend to neglect this point. To prove that 
the discourses of religion and of physics substantially differ is not sufficient to 
exclude apriori any possible conflict. That religion has staked out its own realm 
of discourse does not dispense it from having to enter into dialogue with other 
realms and to render its claims compatible with the "basic" interpretations of 
common sense and the physical sciences. Even the principles of falsifiability 
and verifiability that rule these interpretations should not be immediately dis-
missed as not applying to this "higher" realm. In withdrawing religious truth 
from universal criteria of meaning we rescue it from outside criticism only to 
drown it in total meaninglessness. 
If truth in religion did not share some basic assumptions with other areas of 
truth, the term "truth" as we understand it today would cease to preserve any 
meaning at all. Religious truth, while being distinct, nevertheless relates to all 
aspects of life. Philosophical reflection tolerates neither unmediated pluralism 
nor epistemic relativism, as if one system of truth could remain totally unrelated 
to another. 7 Closing religious doctrines off from other realms of thought may in 
the end create worse problems than open conflicts with them. Precisely the failure 
to harmonize those doctrines with the scientific world view has rendered religion 
so improbable to many of our educated contemporaries as not to deserve any 
serious consideration. C. D. Broad while agreeing with the claim that nothing 
in modem science "refutes" the belief in miracles and in an afterlife, nevertheless 
dismissed it for being totally out of tune with the world picture of science: 
" ... there is literally nothing but a few pinches of philosophical fluff to be put 
in the opposite scale to this vast coherent mass of ascertained facts."8 A prepos-
terous conclusion, but one made possible by the increasing "hermetisation" of 
religious discourse. To avoid the problems of modem culture believers tend to 
compartmentalize their world view. Facing social, psychological, and scientific 
developments which they feel incapable of integrating with their faith they dis-
connect their unexamined religious beliefs from the rest of their convictions, as 
an island of truth isolated from the mainland of modem culture. Yet the believer 
should know that these convictions on a basic level draw a line of probability 
beyond which even the most hallowed "revelation" becomes rationally inadmis-
sible. Rather than outright rejecting the validity of the principle of falsifiability 
in religious truth believers should question the one-sided manner in which the 
positivist usually applies it. They may rightly refuse to accept criteria that fail 
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to account for the specific quality of religious beliefs. But they should at least 
admit the fact, supported by daily apostasies, that faith is in principle falsifiable 
and that the limits of probability, however different from one person to another, 
cannot be stretched indefinitely. 
Taken by itself the theory of coherence proves equally insufficient to account 
for the most characteristic quality of religious truth, namely, that it originates 
outside the system. A brief glance at the theory's most popular current represen-
tative should illustrate this. Reexamining the relation between the objective world 
and the discourse which signifies that world, structuralism concludes that a 
system of discourse filters each new perception through a pre-established, self-suf-
ficient network allowing to emerge only so much as the system is able to handle. 
Decisive for the appearance of objects at any given time is, in the words of 
Michel Foucault, "the interplay of the rules."" Such a self-sufficient, self-referen-
tial structure excludes the world of objects or, for that matter, any other system. 
All assertions refer to the established communal meaning. This is not the place 
to enter into the different varieties of structuralist theories. But their general 
tendency to have social, mostly linguistic, structures, determine thought, restricts 
truth to a social, linguistic problem. A consistent structuralist system, if I under-
stand it correctly, tolerates no intrusion from beyond, indeed, no genuine novelty. 
Since the context alone must account for any possible appearance, the form of 
new phenomena was already apriori implied in the structure itself. Not to admit 
genuine difference is, of course, fatal to any idea of religious truth which implies 
a transcendent revelation. Precisely because he perceived the inability of a closed 
structuralism to admit genuine novelty, Derrida developed a theory of language 
that would allow him to move beyond the intrinsic socio-linguistic limitations. 
His philosophy of the creative word breaking through the given, whereby the 
signifier transcends the signified, appears, paradoxically, to reopen the way to 
a religious transcendence. 10 
Having expressed these objections against the potential of the coherence theory 
to serve as exclusive model for a philosophical evaluation of religious truth, we 
must nevertheless admit its unique appropriateness for legitimating the relative 
autonomy and distinct identity of religious discourse. Our objections bear only 
on the sufficiency of a closed theory of coherence for the purpose of justifying 
the characteristic truth of such a discourse. 
C. Disclosure 
The correspondence and coherence models remain indispensable for under-
standing the truth of religion. But the more they came to reflect the subjective 
tum of modem thought, the more they became removed from what religion itself 
has traditionally understood to be the essence of its truth. We saw how hard it 
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becomes to accommodate the idea of revelation in theories for which the sole 
source of equation or of coherence is the human subject. The disclosure theory 
appears less tainted by modem subjectivism and therefore better suited to recog-
nize the specific nature of religious truth. In recent discussions that theory has 
moved once again to the front stage of the philosophical scene. But its origins 
lie hidden in the beginnings of Western thought. We find it in Plato and Plotinus, 
of course, but, before them, already in Parmenides's famous poem and, even 
earlier, in the dark recesses of Greek myth. In its modem form it reasserts the 
priority of ontological over epistemic truth. "Truth," Heidegger states, does not 
possess its original seat in the proposition but in a disclosure "through which an 
openness essentially unfolds." Allowing things to be, to disclose themselves in 
the open, is the very essence of freedom. Though the essence of truth lies in 
freedom, its focus is not on the subject, but to the openness within which Being 
itself appears. 11 
Such a theory definitely moves closer to the essence of religious truth. Indeed, 
its origin is clearly religious. But here, the problem presents itself rather from 
the opposite angle. How will a theory so obviously dependent upon the traditional 
idea of illumination meet the modem critical demand that truth justify itself. 
Until it does, disclosure may be the concept in which religion views its own 
truth, but philosophy will resist accepting it as the truth of religion. Since the 
days of Heidegger and Marcel, however, hermeneutic philosophy has gone a 
long way in attempting to justify the disclosure theory, not, to be sure, by means 
of the critical method (which would soon reduce disclosure to a subjective 
source), but by a careful analysis of modes of cognition which illuminate Being 
without being restricted by the epistemic criteria of the positive sciences. Thus, 
the aesthetic and the historical consciousness attain truth in a manner which 
surpasses the subordinate moments of historical accuracy and of the aesthetic 
"imitation of nature." Obviously, to apply here the critical norms used in estab-
lishing the foundations of the positive sciences constitutes an ineffective attempt 
to transfer the truth proper to one domain into a different one. Gadamer clearly 
defined the issue: "Our task demands that we recognize in it an experience of 
truth which must not only be critically justified, but which itself is a mode of 
philosophizing."12 "Critical" justification (the term itself is misleading in this 
context!) here consists in a particular "mode of philosophizing," a retracing in 
actu reflecto of what we are actually doing in actu exercito, rather than in 
establishing the kind of critical foundation which philosophy provides for the 
sciences. The purpose ofthis immanent reflection is to uncover the light it sheds 
on Being and on human existence within Being. The real test of the disclosure 
consists in establishing its ontological significance. This, according to Gadamer 
(in the third part of Truth and Method), occurs in a fundamental reflection on 
language. 
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In his discussion of the image Gadamer refers to the ontological quality of 
the iconic symbol by the term Seinszuwachs-augmentation of Being. However 
one may judge this usage, the term eminently applies to the truth disclosed in 
religious symbols and, in the ludaeo-Christian tradition, that means in the first 
place, religious language. Precisely in this ontological nature of the religious 
disclosure resides its characteristic truth. This, I believe, is ultimately what Hegel 
had in mind when he declared the Christian religion to be essentially "true"-that 
is, expressing the deepest dimension of Being. "[Christian doctrine is not merely 
something subjective but is also an absolute, objective content that is in and for 
itself, and has the characteristic of truth. "13 Rather than submitting this disclosure 
to antecedent philosophical criteria, Hegel subordinates this critical awareness 
itself to what he considers the prior, religious disclosure. "[The standpoint of 
religion] is the affirmation that the truth with which consciousness is actively 
related embraces all content within itself. Hence this relation of consciousness 
to this truth is itself the highest level of consciousness, its absolute standpoint. "14 
The absoluteness of religious truth lies in the fact that its disclosure includes all 
reality without having to refer to any reality outside itself, and that it implies its 
own necessity. 15 
But then Hegel adds that the truth of religion is fully disclosed only when 
religion itself loses its representational form and becomes philosophy. The jus-
tification of religious truth-which formerly had mostly consisted in the critical 
reflection upon an already established truth-now constitutes itself as truth. 
Hence the disclosure of religious truth is no longer completed within faith itself. 
At this point we may wonder whether Hegel is not withdrawing with one hand 
what he had given with the other. Nevertheless, in reclaiming ontological ultimacy 
for religious disclosure Hegel supports the position of the mystics who, almost 
unanimously, assert that religious disclosure contains an ontological richness 
unparalleled by any other mode of truth. 
Theologians and many philosophers were quick in appropriating the disclosure 
theory for their explanation of religious truth. Understandably so, since they felt 
they were merely returning an indigenous idea to its original habitat. Religious 
symbols undoubtedly disclose a unique fullness of Being. Of course, philosophers 
still found themselves stranded with the arduous task of justifying this ontological 
manifestation without appealing directly to a supernatural revelation. Many chose 
to ignore this difficult issue and were satisfied with describing the unique disclo-
sure that takes place in the religious act. One need not decide on the natural or 
supernatural origin, they felt, in order to see in the religious act an illumination 
within which all previous contents and relations come to stand in a new light. 
Even as we suddenly perceive a picture that, without any change in the config-
uration, totally transforms a mere complex of lines and colors, so a religious 
disclosure conveys to ordinary reality a symbolic and metaphorical quality. But 
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does such a description philosophically legitimate the religious act? How does 
the ontological disclosure justify the specific beliefs and rules that provided the 
occasion for it? I have already indicated how the traditional requirements of 
verification and falsification in a general way also apply to religion. For the 
religious believer, the ontological disclosure occurs entirely within the language 
of revelation. In the Christian revelation God's living Word provides, with its 
own disclosure, the conditions for the internal justification of its truth. The Spirit 
given with, and in, the Word testifies to the veracity of the message and enables 
the believer to see its evidence. But a justification of this nature is neither 
available nor sufficient to modem philosophy. The idea of a divine revelation, 
far from providing the justifying evidence which disclosure requires, has itself 
come to stand in dire need of support. Nor should we assume, as Gadamer does 
(in analogy with the way revelation justifies itself to the believing mind), that 
language justifies its own disclosure. Because the disclosure of language by itself 
provides no adequate criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood-an essential 
task in the traditional justification of truth. 
One particular characteristic of the disclosure of faith appears to exclude the 
kind of objective, impartial justification on which philosophy insists for the 
legitimation of truth. This disclosure does not consist in a detached intellectual 
insight but requires an involved participation which philosophy cannot, and 
should not, reproduce. Phenomenologists experienced this when they attempted 
to apply to the religious disclosure Husserl's epoche-the bracketing of all 
existential elements needed to bring the phenomenon to its pure "essential" 
appearance. Is a method devised for grasping the object as it appears in the 
immanence of the experience qualified to bring out the transcendence of that 
object? How can phenomenology preserve the unique transcendence of what the 
religious act intends? The doxic modality of faith affects not only the real 
(empirical) experience of the act but also the ideal (i.e., independently of the 
psychological conditions of the experience) status of its object. The religious act 
intends its object as lying essentially beyond the immanence of the experience. 
One may well wonder, then, whether the phenomenological method, restricted 
as it is to the ideal immanence of that object suffices for justifying the truth of 
the disclosure. Unlike other acts of consciousness faith never brings its intentional 
object to full immanence. Its object is experienced as lying beyond attainment, 
and its only immanence in the experience consists in the very awareness of a 
lasting transcendence. 
Two prominent students of the phenomenology of religion, Gerardus Van der 
Leeuw and Max Scheler, therefrom concluded that the religious act and its inten-
tional object cannot be understood unless one shares the faith that conditions them, 
that is, unless one accepts the transcendence of its object. 16 Clearly, if this implied 
the need to convert philosophy into faith, philosophy would eo ipso cease to justify 
270 Faith and Philosophy 
the religious disclosure altogether. Yet according to another, milder interpretation, 
an adequate philosophical evaluation of religious disclosure would require only 
that the critic be in some way directly acquainted with its experience. This acquaint-
ance need not consist in a full participation in the faith on which one reflects: it may 
be no more than the memory of an actual faith, or even no specific faith at all, but 
only a personal acquaintance with the religious experience in general. Even so, the 
restriction prevents philosophical reflection on the religious disclosure from being 
universally available. But can a reflection not generally accessible be called philo-
sophical? Does "a truth" that cannot justify itself on a universal basis still be con-
sidered philosophically justified at all? Before answering these questions nega-
tively, we should realize that the aesthetic experience falls under the same restric-
tions. Only a person actually acquainted with such an experience qualifies for 
passing philosophical judgment on it. Rather than to claim that there is no truth in 
the disclosure of art and religion one should conclude that the truth of disclosure, 
aesthetic or religious, intrinsically differs from scientific or historical truth, even 
though they may share some rules. But this much remains certain: religion in-
troduces its own truth without allowing itself to be measured definitively by any 
extrinsic or universal norm. 
Other, perhaps equally fundamental difficulties have emerged from the attempts 
to apply to religion the disclosure theory of truth as formulated by Heidegger. 
Theologians sympathetic to his distinction between Being (Sein) and beings 
(Seiende) have not succeeded in defining the place of God in his structure. Is God 
Being itself, or a being? I doubt whether the issue can be resolved on Heidegger's 
terms. Whether a particular theory of disclosure fits the religious case, depends 
very much on the mode in which it is conceived. Heidegger's disclosure clearly 
differs from, and is possibly incompatible with, the Judaeo-Christian religious dis-
closure. The problem exceeds the linguistic aptitude of Greek concepts for articu-
lating ideas mainly expressed in Hebrew concepts. When Rudolf Bultmann inter-
preted religious truth as existential disclosure, his superior knowledge of the 
Jewish background of Christianity succeeded in neutralizing, at least in part, the 
Hellenic orientation of Heidegger's theory. No, the more fundamental problem 
lies in the very assumption that the Gospel can be exhaustively translated into 
existential terms. Kierkegaard with his own intense interest in an existential 
realization of the Gospel remained acutely aware of the ultimate incongruity 
between transcendent meaning and immanent existence and therefore considered 
all genuinely religious truth to remain permanently hidden from direct communi-
cation. Religious truth is, indeed, interiorly disclosed, but never directly. It 
remains, as Kierkegaard put it, a "pathetic-dialectical" message that is, one which 
after having been passively received, must still be dialectically interiorized. This 
translation into existence, essential to the religious disclosure, consists in a 
never-ending process of mediation. 
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The self-manifestation of the transcendent is, in the end, neither self-under-
standing nor understanding of Being. Though contributing to both, it also surpasses 
them in referring to the inexpressible. Mystical writers have fully accepted this 
paradox. John of the Cross introduces his chapter on "naked truths" with the discon-
certing preface: "You should know, beloved reader, that what they in themselves 
are for the soul is beyond words. "17 He then proceeds by declaring the knowledge 
of God a subject on which "in no way anything can be said. "18 Nor is this inexpres-
sible knowledge "manifest and clear," but "sublime" because "transcending what 
is naturally attainable. "19 These paradoxes of mystical knowledge affect religious 
truth as such: it discloses what can never be fully disclosed. Without accounting for 
this unique mode of religious disclosing a philosophical theory of truth as disclo-
sure, far from "justifying" religious truth, remains incapable of understanding it. 
Religious disclosure conveys a truth that, in its essentials, refuses to submit 
to external criteria. To confirm this conclusion we only have to reflect on the 
notion of experience as religion uses it. Any disclosure takes place in some mode 
of what we vaguely refer to as experience. Now, if experience means no more 
than the various mental processes by which a person, actively and passively, 
responds to the stimuli of his or her life world, the term contains no brief for 
truth. Yet if, as Aristotle taught,2° experience yields a unique form of insight 
that, though not scientific, nevertheless attains a kind of cumulative and never 
completed universality, then it is at least on the way to truth. Experience defines 
its own meaning: the person who experiences learns in the process itself what 
he or she is experiencing. This insight cannot claim the title of truth, however, 
until, beyond a mere empirical awareness, it attains some form of ideal necessity 
and thereby discloses a permanent feature of the real as such. Yet the truth of 
experience does not lie exclusively in its possible result, the knowledge, for 
which it establishes the precondition, but also, and primarily as Gadamer points 
out, in the process itself. 21 Precisely in following the very course of consciousness 
in time experience acquires its unique purchase on truth, namely, that it is and 
becomes increasingly my own experience. It hereby endows truth, on whichever 
level acquired, with some kind of practical indubitability which, though not 
warranting freedom from error, nevertheless secures unsubstitutional evidence. 
Now religious disclosure occurs within a highly personal or intensely communal 
experience and, even when raised to the level of full and universal truth, retains 
this personal or communal quality in being a truth-far-me or a truth-for-us. 
Revelation discloses as much about the believer as it reveals of God: in it a 
transcendent message interacts with an immanent experience. This tight link 
between the message and the experience does not render religious disclosure a 
purely subjective affair. The reality which we experience, in this case the trans-
cendent reality as communicated in revelation, defines the nature ofthe experience 
and endows it with its own authority-not the other way round. 22 
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This, however, by no means implies that in the immanence of his experience 
the believer gains direct access to the transcendent object received by it. The 
experience of faith does not convey the kind of meaning fulfillment whereby 
other modes of thought render their object "personally" present. God never 
appears in the manner in which a sense object bodily presents itself, or in which 
the solution to a mathematical problem suddenly forces its incontrovertible evi-
dence upon the mind." Nonetheless faith carries an evidence of its own which, 
without the manifest presence of its object, illuminates the believer's relation to 
it as vital to the understanding of itself and of all reality. The experience of 
revelation draws the decisive arguments for verifying its content not from external 
sources, but from itself. Believers assume that what they know of the divine 
object they know through that object itself. Christians have traditionally expressed 
this in the doctrine of the indwelling Spirit who teaches them "the entire faith." 
Eckhart echoed it in his word that the eye with which we see God is the eye 
with which He sees Himself. Clearly this kind of evidence provides no scientific 
support for its truth, nor does it lend greater coherence to our empirical observation 
of the world. Neither does it provide metaphysical insight. But it opens up a 
different perspective on metaphysical insight as well as on empirical investigation, 
and brings with it a unique yet highly personal evidence of its own truth. 24 
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